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THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE IN MONTANA: VOTING
PROTECTIONS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION
Hannah Tokerud*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Suffrage is the basic right without which all others are meaningless.
It gives . . . individuals . . . control over their own destinies.”1  Though
today the right of suffrage is widely recognized as a fundamental right,2 the
federal constitution does not expressly grant the people the right to vote.3
By contrast, an individual’s right to vote is protected by more than half of
the state constitutions in their “Declaration of Rights” or “Bill of Rights.”
Most of these state constitutional provisions require elections to be “free,”
“equal” and/or “open.”4  The drafters of many state constitutions included
right-to-vote clauses long before the federal government offered any such
protection.5  In Montana, the right of suffrage is expressly granted by the
state constitution.  Article II, section 13 of the Montana Constitution states:
“All elections shall be free and open, and no power, civil or military, shall
at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”6
* Student, The University of Montana School of Law.  Thanks to Montana Law Review and
Professor Anthony Johnstone.
1. James Grady, Suffrage and Elections, Montana Constitutional Convention Study No. 11, 25
(Mont. Const. Conv. Commn. 1971) (quoting Lyndon Baines Johnson).
2. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (“Undeniably the Constitution of the United
States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections.”).
3. Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 325,
345–346 (Bush v. Gore Issue 2001) (“The Constitution of its own force enfranchises no one. Article I,
Section 2 sets the tone by looking to state law for the determination of who may vote in federal elections
. . . . The Seventeenth Amendment makes the same provision for the electorate that chooses United
States Senators. And, as we were so forcefully reminded by both Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvass-
ing Board and Bush v. Gore, the Constitution gives the people no vote in the presidential election at all.
As for the voting rights provisions of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth
Amendments, none of these confer a right to vote in federal, state, or local elections. Rather, each is
phrased in the negative, eliminating a qualification that a state or locality might otherwise have utilized
to determine who may exercise the franchise but not requiring that anyone actually be enfranchised.”);
see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to
vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a
statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College. . . .
When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the
legislature has prescribed is fundamental . . . . The State, of course, after granting the franchise in the
special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors.”).
4. Matthew C. Jones, Fraud and the Franchise: The Pennsylvania Constitution’s “Free and Equal
Election” Clause as an Independent Basis for State and Local Election Challenges, 68 Temp. L. Rev.
1473, 1474 (1995).
5. Id.
6. Mont. Const. art. II, § 13.
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This clause would appear to bar any act, law, or practice that would prevent
free and open elections.  But what does it mean for an election to be “free
and open”?
Montana lawyers and courts rarely reference this state constitutional
provision despite, or perhaps because of, its vague and broad language.
This comment begins with a discussion of the “free and open” provision
and presents possible explanations for why the right has rarely been cited in
Montana.  The comment then examines how the state constitutional right to
vote has played out in other states.  Finally, the comment discusses a pro-
posed voter identification law (“voter ID law”) that would have implicated
the right to vote in free and open elections in Montana.
II. MONTANA’S RIGHT TO VOTE
A. A Brief History of the Right
Montana’s right-of-suffrage provision has remained unchanged since
its first appearance in the proposed 1884 Montana Constitution.7  The draft-
ers of the 1889 and 1972 constitutions adopted the 1884 provision verba-
tim.8  The 1884 proposed constitution, which was very similar to the 1889
constitution, was largely based on the 1876 Colorado Constitution.9  There
is no discussion of the right-of-suffrage provision on record from the Colo-
rado Constitutional Convention proceedings to shed light on how the draft-
ers understood the right.  Delegates of the 1884 Montana Constitutional
Convention adopted the provision without discussion.10  At the 1889 Mon-
tana Constitutional Convention, much of the delegates’ discussion about
voting centered on whether women should have the right of suffrage.  A
review of the discussion sheds light on what the delegates meant by “open
to everybody.”11  Based on the 1889 Convention transcripts, the delegates
clearly meant open to those persons eligible to vote under existing state and
federal law.
The delegates debated whether to change the provision’s language.12
Delegate Marshall moved to amend the provision by striking out the words
“and open.”13  Marshall said he did “not know what the words ‘and open,’
7. Mont. Const. art. I, § 5 (1884).
8. Mont. Const. art. III, § 5 (1889) (superseded by 1972 Mont. Const. art. II, § 13).
9. Anthony Johnstone, The Constitutional Initiative in Montana, 71 Mont. L. Rev. 325, 328
(2010).
10. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1884 vol. 6.
11. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1889 448–467 (State Publishing Co. 1921).
12. Id. at 98–99.
13. Id. at 98.
2
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as they occur in the section, mean” and thought the phrase was unneces-
sary.14  He argued:
We have now the secret ballot, and by the late law of the Territory the polls
are removed, and no man can come within a certain distance of the place of
voting; and it seems to me that the word as printed may render that law unsat-
isfactory, although that is not the intention; and it seems to me that the words
“and open” really add no force to the section.15
Delegate Bickford opposed the amendment, arguing the phrase had mean-
ing.16  Bickford responded:
Not only are elections to be free, but they are also to be open.  They should be
open to all persons who are legally entitled to vote.  The polls should be open
to all persons, who, under the laws of this Territory and the United States, are
entitled to the right of franchise.  I believe that the words should be left in,
because the right may be protected by their remaining in the place where they
are now.17
There was some discussion of whether the Australian system pre-
vented an open election by making voting secret.18  The Australian ballot
system formalized the voting process by providing uniform, official ballots
that designated officials distributed at polling places and that voters filled
out in a private booth.19  Before the introduction of the Australian system,
states administered elections by voice voting, by paper ballots, or by a com-
bination of both.20  Organized political parties started printing their own
ballots, which were easily identifiable, and distributing them to voters,
which opened the door to bribery, vote buying, and voter intimidation.21
By the late nineteenth century, reformers in the United States, Great Britain,
and Australia thought that the only way to ensure free and fair elections was
to have voters cast their ballots in secrecy, and by 1910, the Australian
system was in place in most states.22  By 1972, most state constitutions
guaranteed the secrecy of voting, but the Montana Constitution did not ex-
plicitly guarantee it.23
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1889, supra n. 11, at 98.
18. Id.
19. Grady, supra n. 1, at 67.
20. David L. Permut and Joseph P. Verdon, Protecting the American Tradition of Write-In Voting
after Burdick v. Takushi, 9 J.L. & Pol. 185, 189–190 (Fall 1992).
21. Id. at 191–192.
22. Id. at 192. Soon after the Australian system was adopted, many states adopted automated voting
systems, which changed how votes were counted but did not change the substance of the Australian
system. Id. at 194.
23. Grady, supra n. 1, at 67. The Montana Constitution did provide for elections by ballot in Article
IV, section 1, and it granted the legislature the authority to pass laws “to protect against the abuse of the
elective franchise [Article IX, section 9].”  The Montana Code Annotated had many provisions relating
to the secrecy of elections. Id.
3
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On this subject, Delegate Robinson argued elections must be open,
even with secret ballots.24  He said, “the elections themselves shall be open
while the ballots may be secret, closed ballots.  But the election itself must
be free and open to everybody—as contradistinguished from any secret
election; it is in public and free to everybody.”25  Robinson seems to be
agreeing with the earlier point that polls should be open to all eligible vot-
ers.  Delegate Warren, however, supported the proposed amendment, argu-
ing it was time for a “free and not open” election.26  According to Warren,
“We have had enough of open elections in this country; and if this clause in
this Constitution is for the purpose of doing away with or making a dead
letter of the Australian System, which is now on our statute books, the
sooner we know it the better.”27  Delegate Middleton responded by saying:
[T]he words “and open,” as used in that section, can certainly mean nothing
more nor less than that the elections shall be public as contradistinguished
from secret.  Now, to say that that has anything to do with the Australian
System of voting, or any other system of voting, is sheer nonsense.  It cer-
tainly is right that that provision should remain where it is.  The elections may
not under any circumstances be conducted secretly.  It means that the election
itself should be public, but it has nothing to do with the mode or manner of
voting.28
Delegates voted on the amendment after this debate, but it did not pass.29
Thus, the adopted provision was identical to that in the 1884 proposed con-
stitution.
The history of the 1889 Convention clarifies what the delegates under-
stood the phrase “free and open” to mean.  The delegates understood
“open” to be consistent with secret ballots.  “Open” seems to refer not to the
ballot form but to the actual accessibility of the voting process.  The elec-
tions were to be in public, free to everybody, and open to everybody.  By
open to everybody, the delegates meant open to eligible voters, as “every-
body” in 1889 did not include women, “idiots and insane” persons, and
felons.30  It is harder to say what “free” meant to the delegates.  “Free”
seems to have meant without restraint as opposed to without cost because
Montanans added an economic qualification for voting in certain types of
elections to the constitution in 1932.31  The U.S. Supreme Court declared
24. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1889, supra n. 11, at 98.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Mont. Const. art. IX, §§ 2, 8 (1889) (superseded by 1972 Mont. Const. art. IV, § 2).
31. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 2 (1932) (superseded by 1972 Mont. Const. art. IX, § 2).  Grady, supra
n. 1, at 38 (citing 1931 Mont. Laws ch. 101).
4
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such provisions unconstitutional and invalid,32 and the Montana Legislature
recognized this by eliminating the requirement and by voting to submit a
proposed constitutional amendment, which would have deleted the provi-
sion.33  Therefore, to the 1972 Convention delegates, “free” probably meant
both without cost and without restraint.
In the 1972 Bill of Rights Committee Comments to the proposed sec-
tion 13, committee members stated the section should be unchanged to
guarantee that elections remain free and open.34  The Committee noted the
proposed provision was the same as that in the 1889 constitution.35  The
Committee further commented that the provision supplemented the General
Government Committee on Suffrage and Elections’s proposals but did not
replace them.36  No delegate proposals were received.37  In March 1972, the
Montana Constitutional Convention adopted the provision unanimously.38
A committee member read the comment mentioned above, and there was no
other discussion.39
Though there was no discussion of the right to vote directly in relation
to Article II, section 13, there was extensive discussion of the right when
delegates discussed Article IV, Suffrage and Elections (which consists of
six sections, including secret ballots, voter qualifications, and candidate
qualifications).40  Delegates stressed the act of voting is a basic right, not a
privilege—that the right to vote is a fundamental, basic, and cherished right
of citizenship, and if there are residency requirements for legislators in dis-
tricts, the right of suffrage will be limited.41  The fact that the delegates
discussed the right to vote only in relation to Article IV and stated that
Article IV supplements Article II, section 13 suggests that Article II, section
13 does not fully secure the right to vote and would not effectively define
the right if Article IV were not also cited.
32. Grady, supra n. 1, at 37 n. 45 (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); City of Phoenix, Ariz. v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204
(1970)).
33. State ex rel. Ward v. Anderson, 491 P.2d 868, 870 (Mont. 1971); see 1971 Mont. Laws. ch. 159.
34. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1972 vol. II, 634 (Mont. Legis. 1972).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at vol. VII, 2640–2641.
39. Id.
40. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1972, supra n. 34, at vol. III, 400–401, 406,
552.
41. Id.
5
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B. The Right to Vote and Voter Qualifications
In the 1971 Montana Constitutional Convention Commission report on
Suffrage and Elections, James Grady painted a picture of the delegates’
understanding of election law at the time, which included the perception
that state responsibility for establishing voter qualifications had been
usurped by federal action in the previous decade.  Grady referenced the
1963 Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and noted that the
Commission focused on federal protection for the right to vote.42  The
Commission on Civil Rights asserted that the federal government needed to
protect and guarantee the right to vote and that the only effective way to do
so was for Congress to enact uniform voter qualification standards.43
Grady wrote: “With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress
directly challenged the basic doctrine of state responsibility in establishing
voter qualifications.”44
Though Grady did not cite Article II when he mentioned the impor-
tance of the right to vote,45 he noted the provision when discussing the
Legislature’s almost unlimited power to enact laws relative to the right of
suffrage.46  As Grady pointed out, only federal and state constitutions and
federal laws restrict this power.47  General constitutional limitations include
provisions that establish the right to vote, prohibit special laws on con-
ducting any election or designating the place of voting, and provide that if a
voter meets the established qualifications, her right to vote cannot be im-
pinged upon.48
Given this historical understanding of the broad scope of legislative
power to define and limit the right to vote and the understanding that consti-
tutional provisions do little to limit legislative discretion, various theories
exist about how to best protect the right to vote from this legislative power.
One theory is that state constitutions should expressly list voting qualifica-
tions to ensure the legislature cannot later add to or change the qualifica-
tions.49  Another approach is that state constitutions include only a simple
statement that the qualifications of electors shall be as provided in the con-
42. Grady, supra n. 1, at 22 (referencing Report on the President’s Commission on Registration and
Voting Participation 60 (Govt. Printing Off. 1963)).
43. Id. at 21.
44. Id. at 22.
45. Id. at 25.  Grady, like the Montana Constitutional Convention delegates, cited the Qualified
Elector Provision instead, noting statutory law augments Montana’s constitutional suffrage provisions.
Id. at 26.
46. Id. at 41.  Pursuant to Article IV, section 3, the Legislature has the express power to enact laws
to preserve the purity of elections.
47. Grady, supra n. 1, at 41.
48. Id. at 42.
49. Id.
6
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stitution.50  Yet another approach is to specify, and thereby limit, the areas
in which the legislature may act.51  The Montana delegates seem to have
selected the latter approach of limiting the areas in which the legislature can
act but did not include specific residence and registration requirements in
the constitution.52
C. Voter Registration Systems
Commentators also debate the extent to which registration systems
should be outlined in state constitutions.53  While registration requirements
are not generally intended as an additional qualification for voting, but as a
mechanism to verify voters’ identities, courts have occasionally invalidated
registration laws and held that they do in effect add new requirements for
voting.54  Oftentimes, state constitutions, including the Montana Constitu-
tion, simply authorize the legislature to establish a system of registration.55
To some, registration is an administrative matter and “the best means of
promoting efficiency and voter participation, while preventing fraud, is a
statutory question.”56  According to these commentators, legislatures should
be able to update methods of registration as data-processing and record-
keeping technology advances, and courts should be able to ensure that the
legislature does not use registration laws to modify voting requirements.57
This mirrors the discussion of the 1972 Convention delegates who noted
that “[a]pproximately 60 percent of the states include specific residency and
registration requirements in their constitutions, but most of the newer state
constitutions . . . leave these matters to the Legislative Assembly.”58  Dele-
gate Etchart, speaking on the General Government Committee’s Suffrage
and Elections report, said “[t]he proposed article [IV, section 2] constitu-
tionally gives the Legislature the major burden for establishing explicit re-
gistration and residence requirements.”59
Registration laws at the end of the nineteenth century paint a picture of
how the delegates of the 1889 Convention understood the right to vote.  The
voter registration law in 1895 read as follows:
No person is entitled to vote at any election mentioned in this title, except as
otherwise provided in this title, unless his name on the day of the election
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Mont. Const. art. IV, § 3.
53. Grady, supra n. 1, at 76.
54. Id. at 75.
55. Id. at 77.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1972, supra n. 34, at vol. III, 400.
59. Id. at 392.
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appears in the “check lists,” on the copy of the official register furnished by
the registry agents to the judges of election at the election precinct at which
he offers to vote, or unless he produces and surrenders a county registry cer-
tificate or a state registry certificate, as provided in §§ 1204 and 1217, of this
code, and the fact that his name so appears in the “check lists” and in the copy
of the official register in the possession of the judges of election is prima
facie evidence of his right to vote.60
The “check list” was a list of the names of all electors on the official
register.61  The registry agent alphabetically arranged the names of electors
registered for each election precinct.62  To be added to the “check list,” a
voter took the following oath or affirmation, which was administered by a
registry agent:
I do solemnly swear or affirm that I am a citizen of the United States; that I
am of the age of twenty-one years, and will have been a resident of Montana
one year, and in the county thirty days preceding the day of the next ensuing
election and that I am not registered elsewhere in Montana for this electoral
year, so help me God (or under the pains and penalties for perjury).63
If someone asked to be registered to vote and the registry agent did not
know whether or not he met the voting qualifications, the registry agent was
required to question the applicant about his qualifications.  If the agent was
“satisfied,” he could enter the applicant’s name in the register.  If he was
“not fully satisfied” or if a qualified elector challenged the applicant, “the
registry agent must require the applicant to answer truly, under oath or affir-
mation, the following questions, together with such questions as said regis-
try agent may consider necessary or proper, testing his qualifications as an
elector for the ensuing election.”64  The registry agent was to ask the appli-
cant whether he met the qualifications listed in the registry oath (U.S. citi-
zenship; 21 years old by the day of the next election; residence in Montana
for one year and in the county for 30 days before the election; resident of
the registration district in which he proposed to be registered; and not regis-
tered to vote in any other district).65  If the applicant did not meet the quali-
fications, he could not register.66
Voter registration systems became increasingly important with popula-
tion growth, which meant high-population density urban areas and the in-
creased mobility of voters.67  Because election officials could no longer
60. Mont. Political Code § 1380 (1895).
61. Mont. Political Code § 1215.
62. Id.
63. Mont. Political Code § 1209.
64. Mont. Political Code § 1210.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Grady, supra n. 1, at 74–75.
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personally recognize voters, they needed a system to prevent fraud.68  This
helps explain why changes to registration laws were implemented.  How-
ever, recent attempts to pass voter ID laws, which this comment examines
in Section IV, suggest that something may have changed to make these laws
inadequate to protect voting or that there is a perception that something has
changed.
Though the discussions from the three Conventions are helpful in de-
termining what the delegates meant by “free and open” elections, they do
little to explain how or when the clause would be enforced.  The registra-
tion laws that were in place at the end of the nineteenth century further
illuminate the delegates’ understanding of the right to vote.  However, it is
still unclear what exactly Article II, section 13 means, which is one reason
that lawyers today rarely cite it, as discussed in the next section.
D. The Right to Vote in Montana Case Law
This section gives a survey of the Montana case law on Article II,
section 13.  There are only nine Montana cases that cite Article II, section
13 and even fewer cases that address it in any detail.  Oftentimes, the right
to vote has simply been included in a laundry list of provisions cited to
prove a particular point, such as the progressive nature of the Montana Con-
stitution.69
For example, in Finke v. State ex rel. McGrath,70 the Montana Su-
preme Court cited the right to vote in addressing a challenge to a statute
relating to municipal and county elections that limited participation to re-
cord owners of real property.71 Because the statutes at issue involved the
fundamental right to vote, the Court applied strict scrutiny and declared the
statute unconstitutional.72  In so holding, the Court listed a total of six Mon-
tana and U.S. constitutional provisions that were at issue but failed to say
how each provision factored into its decision.73
E. Why the Right Has Been Cited So Rarely
Considering that Article II, section 13 has been cited so infrequently,
often just appearing in a laundry list of constitutional provisions, it seems at
first glance that the right has little substantive force and may serve prima-
68. Id. at 75.
69. See Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 108 (Mont. 2008) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“The right to
vote is explicitly and broadly protected by Article II, Section 13.”).
70. Finke v. State ex rel. McGrath, 65 P.3d 576 (Mont. 2003).
71. Id. at 581.
72. Id. at 580–581.
73. Id. at 579.
9
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rily as a constitutional platitude.  Usually, the Montana Supreme Court
broadly construes the rights contained in the Declaration of Rights,74 which
makes its cursory treatment of Article II, section 13 all the more notewor-
thy.
Montana is not the only state where the right to vote under the state
constitution is rarely implicated.  State courts rarely use their constitutional
right-to-vote clauses to void elections, instead relying upon specific statu-
tory mechanisms.75  Matthew C. Jones conducted a similar inquiry into the
right to vote under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and his analysis of why
the constitutional right is rarely cited to remedy election fraud76 may apply
to the Montana experience.  Pennsylvania’s constitutional right-to-vote pro-
vision is identical to Article II, section 13 and is supplemented by the Penn-
sylvania Election Code.77  Jones concluded that Pennsylvania’s right-vote-
clause “most likely does not afford voters an independent basis for chal-
lenging a fraudulent state or local election in state court.”78  He argued that
the statutory scheme “poses substantial financial and political barriers to
many election challenges,” so that an independent “construction of the state
constitution is necessary to ensure full compliance with the constitutional
mandate of ‘free and equal’ elections.”79  So long as these barriers persist,
he predicted that litigants would bring election challenges in federal, not
state, court.80  Jones presents one possible explanation for why the right-to-
vote article comes up so rarely, namely that litigators bring claims under the
state election code instead.81  James A. Gardner presents two more possible
explanations for why state court judges rarely adjudicate election law dis-
putes, particularly gerrymandering. These explanations are that election
lawyers are reluctant to bring election law claims in state court and that
state court judges are reluctant to decide election law cases.82
It may be easier for litigants to bring a claim under Title 13 of the
Montana Code Annotated and Article IV, section 2, instead of under Article
II, section 13.  As Jones explains, most states treat their constitutional elec-
tion clauses as “enabling” provisions and “have enacted legislation to en-
74. See e.g. State v. Scheetz, 950 P.2d 722, 725 (Mont. 1997) (“Montana, however, recognizes
broader protections for an individual’s right of privacy pursuant to Article II, Section 10, of Montana’s
Constitution, than the United States Supreme Court does pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, and other states typically do pursuant to their state constitutions.”).
75. Jones, supra n. 4, at 1474.
76. Id.
77. Pa. Const. art. I, § 5; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 25 §§ 2600–3555 (2013).
78. Jones, supra n. 4, at 1475.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, 3
Election L.J. 643, 643, 651 (Winter 2004).
10
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force the constitutional mandate of ‘free and equal’ elections.”83  In states
where litigants may only bring election challenges via statutory mecha-
nisms, “constitutional Election Clauses have no independent use and pro-
vide no independent right of action to the disfranchised citizen.”84  In other
states, the constitutional election clause provides an independent basis for
election challenges.85  Montana does not seem to clearly fall under either
category.  There is no mandate that parties must follow the election code
procedures, but there is also no instance of a party relying solely on Article
II, section 13.  For example, in Finke, the Court did not cite the election
code but cited six state and federal constitutional provisions.86  Perhaps the
inherent ambiguity of the phrase “free and equal” leads practitioners and
courts to cite other constitutional or statutory provisions.87  The 1972 Con-
vention delegates thought other provisions supplemented the right,88 and
the structure of the constitution does not limit lawyers to a single avenue of
challenge.  Or perhaps Montana’s elections are so well-run that legal chal-
lenges are few and far between.
Another reason the clause is so rarely cited may simply be explained
by election lawyers’ reluctance to go to state courts.  Election lawyers have
been reluctant to bring election cases in state courts under state constitu-
tions,89 and this may be because state courts generally do not monitor state
political processes using state constitutions.90  Indeed, state courts rarely
interpret any provisions of state constitutions.91  Thus, the absence of an
extensive body of election case law does not necessarily mean judges are
reluctant to apply state constitutional electoral provisions; in fact, state
courts may be increasingly relying on state constitutional provisions when
adjudicating challenges relating to apportionment.92  State judges may defer
to federal judges’ interpretations of state constitutions because they feel
83. Jones, supra n. 4, at 1474–1475.
84. Id. at 1475.
85. Id.
86. Finke, 65 P.3d at 579.
87. See Kirk H. Porter, Suffrage Provisions in State Constitutions, The American Political Science
Review vol. 13, no. 4, 579 (1919) (“In a great many constitutions the phrase ‘all elections shall be free
and equal’ is used.  It is hard to tell what the phrase means and in any event it is useless.”).
88. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1972, supra n. 34, at vol. II, 634.
89. Gardner, supra n. 82, at 643.
90. Id. at 650.
91. Id. at 650–651.
92. Id. at 651.  “In the 2000 redistricting cycle, for example, courts in Colorado, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Virginia—none of which has a supreme court with a strong record of active reliance on its
state constitution—all issued opinions providing new and important guidance concerning the meaning of
state constitutional provisions regulating the redistricting process.” Id.  Ohio voters upheld their redis-
tricting process in the November 2012 election by rejecting the Ohio Redistricting Amendment, an
initiated constitutional amendment to create a citizen redistricting commission. Results for Issue 2: Ohio
Redistricting Amendment, http://stateimpact.npr.org/ohio/tag/issue-2-2012/ (accessed Apr. 10, 2013).
11
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“that the federal judiciary typically does a more or less adequate job of
protecting individual rights and that there is thus no pressing need for state
intervention under state constitutions.”93  State courts are more willing to
act when they feel that federal courts are not adequately protecting rights
and think they are needed as the last line of defense.94
State judges may be reluctant to interfere in election issues.  Mon-
tana’s district court judges are elected, and elected judges may depend more
on the favor of political parties and leaders than appointed judges, who may
be more willing to take controversial positions.95  State judges may be par-
ticularly reluctant to take democratically unpopular positions regarding the
state constitution.96
III. THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN OTHER STATES
In general, state courts have been less likely than federal courts to up-
hold voter ID laws.97  Many state constitutions include provisions similar or
identical to Article II, section 13.  This section lists the constitutional provi-
sions of five other states and gives examples of how the respective state
court has applied that provision.  Given the dearth of Montana precedent on
the issue, a Montana court might look to other states when deciding such a
case, especially to a state with a similar or identical constitutional provision.
Thus, the way other states apply these provisions may provide a model for
Montana and may help us predict how a Montana court would analyze a
claim brought under Article II, section 13.
A. Indiana
Under the Indiana Constitution, “All elections shall be free and
equal.”98
In League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc. v. Rokita,99 the challenged
voter ID law required voters to show a form of government identification
with an expiration date and a photo.100  The plaintiffs cited state constitu-
tional provisions on voter qualifications and equal privileges in support of
their position that Indiana’s voter ID law violated the Indiana Constitu-
93. Gardner, supra n. 82, at 651.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Samuel P. Langholz, Fashioning a Constitutional Voter-Identification Requirement, 93 Iowa L.
Rev. 731, 782 (2008).
98. Ind. Const. art. 2, § 1.
99. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. 2010).
100. Id. at 767.
12
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tion.101  Though the plaintiffs did not mention the “free and equal” provi-
sion in their brief,102 the Supreme Court of Indiana noted the provision’s
relevance.103  The defendant pointed to this constitutional provision to sup-
port his argument that the General Assembly has the power to protect the
rights of citizens to “a fair and reliable electoral system in which their indi-
vidual votes are not diluted by the fraudulently cast votes of others.”104  The
Court concluded, “It is within the power of the legislature to require voters
to identify themselves at the polls using a photo ID.”105
Because the Court concluded that the voter ID law was merely an elec-
tion regulation, the Court applied Indiana’s test for reasonableness and uni-
formity, which the law passed.106  The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that the voter ID law was unconstitutional because it established addi-
tional substantive voter qualifications.107  The Court also rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that the voter ID law was unconstitutional for violating
the equal protection and immunities clause of the state constitution.108  Ac-
cording to the dissent, a motion to dismiss was inappropriate because the
plaintiffs sufficiently pled substantial impediments to the exercise of the
right to vote.109  The dissent does not mention the “free and equal” provi-
sion.
In League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc., the Court contrasted the
Indiana voter ID law with the Missouri law that had been struck down in
Weinschenk v. Missouri, discussed in Part D.110  The Court noted that the
facts differed; whereas citizens may have had to spend money to obtain the
necessary documents to get a photo ID in Missouri, there was no cost in
Indiana.111  Not only were the voter ID laws different, so are the state con-
stitutions.112
In State Election Board v. Bartolomei,113 a redistricting case, the Su-
preme Court of Indiana found the “impingement upon the right to vote is
the natural and unavoidable consequence of redistricting.”114  The Court
101. Id.
102. Appellant’s Br., League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 2009 WL 1023484 at *8 (Mar.
2, 2009).  Instead, the appellants cited Indiana Constitution Article 2, section 2, on voting qualifications.
Id.
103. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 763.
104. Id. at 765 (quoting Appellee’s Br. at *13 (Apr. 15, 2009)).
105. Id. at 772.
106. Id. at 767–768.
107. Id. at 767.
108. Id. at 771–772.
109. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 778 (Boehm, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 772–773 (majority).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 773.
113. St. Election Bd. v. Bartolomei, 434 N.E.2d 74 (Ind. 1982).
114. Id. at 78.
13
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further held redistricting does not contravene the requirement of the “free
and equal” provision because “[r]edistricting is the very technique by which
the equality of the force of each vote is maintained as shifts in the popula-
tion occur.”115
In these cases, the Supreme Court of Indiana did not use its constitu-
tional right-to-vote provision to invalidate voter ID and redistricting laws.
Instead, the Court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.116  The majority in Crawford
upheld an Indiana voter ID law, finding the state justifications for the law
neutral and sufficiently strong and deeming relief inappropriate even though
the burden on a few voters’ right to vote may have been unjustified.117  The
Court applied Crawford “even though the U.S. Supreme Court decided a
federal constitutional challenge and the Indiana Supreme Court was consid-
ering a differently worded and voting-specific Indiana Constitutional provi-
sion.”118  This is not a promising model for a robust state right-to-vote pro-
vision.
B. Pennsylvania
Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, “Elections shall be free and
equal; and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent
the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”119
In Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,120 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania cited the “free and equal” provision and noted the
right to vote is a fundamental right in Pennsylvania.121  It was clear to state
officials that the integrity of the November General Election would have
been impaired if enforcement of the voter ID law prevented qualified and
eligible electors from voting.122  The plaintiffs argued that many qualified
voters would be disenfranchised because they would not have enough time
to learn about the law’s requirements and to obtain the necessary identifica-
tion.123  The plaintiffs conceded that nothing is inherently wrong with a
voter ID law in the abstract, but they argued implementation of this law
115. Id.
116. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 761, 767–768 (relying on Crawford v.
Marion Co. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008)).
117. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 199–200, 204.
118. Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote under State Constitutions, 67 Vanderbilt L. R. at *16
(forthcoming 2014, draft as of Mar. 17, 2013).
119. Pa. Const. art. I, § 5.
120. Applewhite v. Pa., 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id.
14
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created problems.124  The case was remanded so the lower court could as-
sess the availability of the alternate identification cards in the time since
they first had been available.125
On remand, the district court issued a preliminary injunction finding
that some voter disenfranchisement could occur if the state implemented the
voter ID law in the November election.126  The court did not restrain elec-
tion officials from requesting IDs but did enjoin those parts of the voter ID
law that would result in disenfranchisement based on a failure to present
photo-identification for in-person voting.127
Strengthening the state constitutional right to vote was not a main con-
cern of either the Supreme Court or the trial court.  The Supreme Court
remanded the case “to make a present assessment of the actual availability
of the alternate identification cards on a developed record in light of the
experience since the time the cards became available.”128  The trial court
was not directed to apply strict scrutiny but to determine whether there was
liberal access to identity cards and whether there would be voter disen-
franchisement without a preliminary injunction.129  In this case, Penn-
sylvania also fails to present a strong model for applying the state right-to-
vote provision.
C. Georgia
The Georgia Constitution states:
Every person who is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Georgia
as defined by law, who is at least 18 years of age and not disenfranchised by
this article, and who meets minimum residency requirements as provided by
law shall be entitled to vote at any election by the people.  The General As-
sembly shall provide by law for the registration of electors.130
In Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups,131 a federal district court case,
the plaintiffs argued that a photo identification law “imposes an unautho-
rized, unnecessary, and undue burden on the fundamental right to vote of
hundreds of thousands of registered Georgia voters.”132  The plaintiffs fur-
ther contended: “The Georgia legislature simply has no power to regulate
voting outside the areas of defining residency and establishing registration
124. Id. at 4–5.
125. Id. at 5.
126. Applewhite v. Pa., No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 4497211 at *4 (Pa. Cmmw. Oct. 2, 2012).
127. Id. at **4–6.
128. Applewhite, 54 A.3d at 5.
129. Id. at 4.
130. Ga. Const. art. 2, § 1 (emphasis added).
131. Com. Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
132. Id. at 1329.
15
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requirements.”133  In a letter to the Governor, the Secretary of State shared
her belief that the law violated the Georgia Constitution by imposing both a
qualification on voters that was not listed in the Georgia Constitution and
an undue burden on the fundamental right of citizens to vote.134  Interest-
ingly, the right to vote and the qualifications for voters are listed in the
same constitutional provision in the Georgia Constitution.135  The court
found that under either strict scrutiny or the more flexible Burdick test,136
the plaintiffs had a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of
their claim that the photo ID requirement unduly burdened the right to
vote.137  The court granted the plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion.138
In Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue,139 the plaintiffs ar-
gued that a state voter ID law violated the right to vote because, by requir-
ing in-person voters to show a photo ID, it imposed an unauthorized condi-
tion and qualification for voting.140  The Supreme Court of Georgia deter-
mined that the law did not affect registration or place a condition on the
right to vote because no photo ID was required for voter registration and a
voter could choose a manner of voting that did not require a photo ID.141
Therefore, the Court upheld the law as a reasonable procedure for verifying
that the person who came to vote and the person who registered to vote
were the same person.142  The Court said the Georgia Constitution does not
require that qualified citizens be allowed to vote in any particular manner
133. Id. at 1357.
134. Id. at 1335.
135. Ga. Const. art. 2, § 1.  The fact that the Montana drafters did not structure Article II, section 13
this way suggests the Montana constitutional provision may not exclusively reference voter qualifica-
tions.
136. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).  “A court considering a challenge to a state election
law must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put for-
ward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Id. at 434 (citing
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). The rigorousness of the Court’s “inquiry into the
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights,” and “when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the
regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’” Id. (citing
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).  “[W]hen a state election law imposes only ‘reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” Id. (citing Anderson,
460 U.S. at 788).
137. Com. Cause/Ga., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
138. Id.
139. Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. 2011).
140. Id. at 69.
141. Id. at 72.
142. Id.
16
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and that the photo ID requirement is not an impermissible qualification on
voting.143
Interestingly, there was a different result in each of the Georgia cases.
In Common Cause/Georgia, the law required that all in-person voters pre-
sent a government-issued photo ID.144  Everyone who wanted an acceptable
photo ID was required to complete an application and pay a fee.145  The
federal district court analyzed the law under both strict scrutiny and the
Burdick test.146  In Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc., the photo ID law in
question was much like the law scrutinized in Common Cause/Georgia, ex-
cept that the fee was eliminated.147  In Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc.,
the Court only applied the Burdick federal balancing test.148  Though the
elimination of the fee may partly explain the varying results, more likely the
difference resulted from the application of different levels of scrutiny.
D. Missouri
Missouri’s Constitution includes a provision identical to the Montana
provision.149
In Weinschenk v. Missouri,150 the Missouri Supreme Court held that a
voter ID law violated Missouri’s equal protection clause and Missouri’s
constitutional guarantee of the right of its qualified, registered citizens to
vote—the Court cited the aforementioned provision as well as the voter
qualifications provision.151  The Court acknowledged that the state had a
compelling interest in preventing voter fraud but argued the photo ID re-
quirement was not narrowly tailored to do so.152  The Court held the state
right to vote provides more protection than the federal right to vote because,
under federal law, the right to vote in state elections is only implied,
whereas it is express under the Missouri Constitution.153
The Missouri voter ID law prohibited the use of out-of-state identifica-
tion, social security cards, utility bills, and school and work IDs.  According
to the Court, in practice the law made a Missouri driver’s license, non-
driver’s license, or U.S. passport the only acceptable forms of identifica-
143. Id. at 72–73.
144. Com. Cause/Ga., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
145. Id. at 1339.
146. Id. at 1366.
147. Democratic Party of Ga., Inc., 707 S.E.2d at 70.
148. Id. at 728–729.
149. Mo. Const. art 1, § 25.
150. Weinschenk v. Mo., 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006).
151. Id. at 204.
152. Id.
153. Id.
17
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tion.154  The Missouri Court in Weinschenk applied strict scrutiny because it
determined the law impinged the right to vote.155  Thus, to be constitu-
tional, the law would have to be supported by a compelling state interest
and would have to be both narrowly tailored and necessary.  If the Court
had determined the law would not “impose a heavy burden on the right to
vote” and would impact few voters, it would have applied a lesser standard
of scrutiny.156
The Missouri Court recognized that the state constitution provides
greater protection of voting rights than the federal constitution.157  The
Court examined the burden of the law on the state right to vote and stressed
that the appropriate test was constitutionality under the state constitution,
not under Burdick.158  In this case, the Court did apply the state right-to-
vote provision to invalidate a voter ID law.  Even had the law been “permis-
sible under the U.S. Constitution the court would invalidate it under the
state constitution.”159
E. Wisconsin
Under the Wisconsin Constitution, “Every United States citizen age 18
or older who is a resident of an election district in this state is a qualified
elector of that district.”160
In League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Network, Inc. v.
Walker,161 the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin certified the appeal, and two
related motions, to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.162  The Court of Appeals
summarized the circuit court’s reasoning for declaring the photo ID law’s
requirements unconstitutional.163  According to the circuit court, the Wis-
consin constitution grants the right to vote to all electors, subject to limited
qualifications on residency, registration, and absentee voting that the legis-
lature may enact.164  The photo ID law “is not expressly authorized by arti-
cle III of the Wisconsin Constitution because it is not one of the stated
qualifications for an elector in section 1, nor does it fall within the scope of
154. Id. at 205.
155. Id. at 215.
156. Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 215–216.
157. Id. at 212.
158. Id. at 216.  The Court said that under Burdick it would find a severe burden on the right to vote
and apply strict scrutiny. Id.
159. Douglas, supra n. 118, at *24.
160. Wis. Const. art. 3, § 1.
161. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 2012 WL 1020229 (Wis. App.
2012).
162. Id. at *1.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied certification. League of Women Voters of Wis.
Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 811 N.W.2d 821 (2012).
163. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc., 2012 WL 1020229 at *1.
164. Id.
18
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an express delegation of legislative authority under section 2.”165  Thus, if
the law were constitutional, it would be because the legislature had the au-
thority to enact it pursuant to its plenary powers.166  The legislature may
“exercise its plenary power . . . to say ‘how, when, and where’ ballots shall
be cast” so long as five tests are met, including that the legislation “not
violate ‘the express guaranty of the right to vote’” and “not impose addi-
tional conditions making it ‘impracticable or impossible’ for a qualified
elector to vote at an election.”167  Under the photo ID law, “even qualified
electors may not vote in an election unless they display acceptable govern-
ment-authorized photo identification either at the polls or to election offi-
cials by 4:00 p.m. on the Friday following the election.”168  The circuit
court reasoned that the legislature did not have the authority to enact the
law because it “‘eliminate[d] the right to suffrage altogether’ for qualified
electors who lack acceptable photo identification” and “serve[d] as an addi-
tional condition for voting.”169  Because the legislature did not have express
or implied authority to enact the law, “the provisions of [the photo ID law]
are void and should be permanently enjoined.”170  In this case, the Court of
Appeals did not even reference a federal right to vote or federal law but
solely relied on the state constitution.171
Even with nearly identical constitutions and voter ID laws, states have
reached different results.  According to Joshua Douglas, the results depend
on “the amount of deference the state courts gave to federal constitutional
interpretation of the right to vote when construing the respective state con-
stitutions.”172  Indeed, in these five states, the results do vary depending on
the test the court applied.  The Court in Indiana did not base its decisions on
the state constitution.  In Pennsylvania, the law was partly enjoined but not
on the basis of the state constitution.  In Georgia, two courts reached differ-
ent results by applying different tests.  In Missouri and Wisconsin, the
courts struck down the voter ID laws based on the state right-to-vote provi-
sions.
IV. APPLICATION OF VOTER ID LAW
This section discusses a Montana voter ID law that was proposed in
both the 2011 and 2013 legislative sessions.  The section then predicts how
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at **1–2.
168. Id. at *2.
169. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc., 2012 WL 1020229 at *2.
170. Id.
171. Douglas, supra n. 118, at *23.
172. Id. at *3.
19
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Montana courts would analyze the proposed law, including the applicable
level of scrutiny and whether the proposed law would survive that level of
scrutiny.
A. Voter ID Law, House Bill 152
House Bill 152 (“the Bill”),173 a voter ID law passed by the Montana
Legislature in 2011 but vetoed by Governor Schweitzer, would probably
violate the right to vote under the Montana Constitution if passed.  State
Representative Ted Washburn, a Republican from Bozeman, introduced the
Bill in 2011,174 and Washburn reintroduced the Bill during the 2013 legisla-
tive session.175  The Bill was tabled in January 2013 and did not meet the
April 5, 2013, deadline for the revenue bill transmittal.176  Washburn be-
lieves the Bill will prevent nonresidents from coming to Montana to vote.177
Under current law, eligible individuals can register to vote within 30 days
of moving to Montana and can present a utility bill as proof of residence.178
The Bill, however, would require a Montana driver’s license as the primary
form of identification and effectively means residents would have to live in
Montana for 60 days before registering to vote.179  The only acceptable
forms of identification would be a Montana driver’s license, a state ID card
for non-drivers, and a tribal ID.180  Passports, college IDs, and military IDs
would not be allowed.181
Arguing in support of the law, Washburn cryptically states that he “be-
lieves that Montana should deal with Montana issues.”182  He argues that,
under current law, people undeserving of the right to vote in Montana are
allowed to vote: “the basic right to vote is better than being in the state for
30 days and having a utility bill.”183  He is particularly concerned about
seasonal residents and out-of-state college students voting in Montana elec-
173. Mont. H. 152, 62d Legis. Sess. (Apr. 25, 2011).
174. John Celock, Montana Voter ID Law Pushed by State Lawmaker, Huffington Post, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/29/montana-voter-id_n_2212152.html (Nov. 29, 2012).
175. Mont. H. 108, 63d Legis. Sess. (Dec. 13, 2012).
176. Montana Legislature, Detailed Bill Information, H.B. 108, http://laws.leg.mt.gov/legprd/LAW
0210W$BSIV.ActionQuery?P_BILL_NO1=108&P_BLTP_BILL_TYP_CD=HB&Z_ACTION=Find&
P_SESS=20131.
177. Id.
178. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13–1–111, 13–2–110.
179. Mont. H. 152, 62d Legis. Sess. (Apr. 25, 2011).
180. Id.
181. Celock, supra n. 174.
182. Ketti Wilhelm, Critics of Montana’s Voter Laws Look Forward to Making Changes, Montana
Public Media, http://www.montanapublicmedia.org/2012/11/critics-of-montanas-voting-and-registra-
tion-laws-look-forward-to-making-changes/ (Nov. 6, 2012).
183. Celock, supra n. 174.
20
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tions.184  Washburn wants to make out-of-state students “show a commit-
ment to the state in order to vote.”185  Washburn has expressed concern
about college students buying fake ID cards to purchase alcohol and vote in
Montana.186  Washburn said students are buying fake Montana IDs in New
York City and other out-of-state locations.  Ostensibly, they could use those
fake IDs to register to vote in Montana.187  Washburn does not believe that
members of the armed services should be allowed to vote in Montana un-
less they are residents.188  Concerns about the special needs of, or chal-
lenges presented by, student and service member voters are not new.  At the
1972 Constitutional Convention, an amendment failed that would have lim-
ited absentee voting to service members and students.189
Secretary of State Linda McCulloch expressed her opposition to voter
ID laws in her successful campaign in 2012.190  In an op-ed piece for the
Billings Gazette in September 2012, she stated that a state audit showed
voter fraud was nonexistent in Montana.191  Washburn remains concerned,
stating: “There’s no way for a state to check if you’re registered in another
state . . . . [s]o theoretically, you could vote in at least two states in a
presidential election.”192  Washburn concedes the Bill would not address
this issue but says “at least they’ll have to show [photo] ID here in Mon-
tana.”193  When Governor Schweitzer vetoed the Bill, he noted the unneces-
sary burden it placed on elderly, low-income, disabled, and student vot-
ers.194
B. Standard of Scrutiny
A Montana court likely would apply strict scrutiny to the Bill because
the right to vote is a fundamental right, as the Montana Supreme Court
stated in Finke195 and as the delegates to the 1972 Convention recog-
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1972, supra n. 34, at vol. III, 432–433.
190. Linda McCulloch, Guest Opinion: Audits show voter fraud nonexistent in Montana, Billings
Gazette, http://billingsgazette.com/news/opinion/guest/guest-opinion-audits-show-voter-fraud-nonexis-
tent-in-montana/article_39594bb0-1991-51f5-844a-8fa956de2954.html (Sept. 9, 2012).
191. Id.
192. Wilhelm, supra n. 182.
193. Id.
194. Associated Press, Governor vetoes bill for photo-ID voter registration, Helena Independent
Record, http://helenair.com/news/governor-vetoes-bill-for-photo-id-voter-registration/article_b55330d2-
77a4-11e0-acac-001cc4c002e0.html (May 6, 2011).
195. Finke, 65 P.3d at 580.
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nized.196  The Court has noted that “[b]ecause voting rights cases involve a
fundamental political right, the [U.S.] Supreme Court generally evaluates
state legislation apportioning representation and regulating voter qualifica-
tions under the strict scrutiny standard.”197  When confronted with “legisla-
tion that implicates a fundamental constitutional right,” the Montana Su-
preme Court applies strict scrutiny.198  Under strict scrutiny, suspect legisla-
tion is “unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are
‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’”199  The legis-
lature would be tasked with presenting a record to prove voter fraud and
any other circumstances that provide a compelling interest for the law.
If the court based its analysis on that of the Supreme Court of Missouri
in Weinschenk, it would analyze the Bill under its own Burdick-like test in
addition to a strict scrutiny analysis.  Under Burdick, a court must weigh
“‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . .’ against ‘the precise interests
put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its
rule,’” and must “[take] into consideration ‘the extent to which those inter-
ests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’”200  A Montana
court using this approach would likely begin its analysis by looking to the
extent of the burden the law places on the right to vote.  As a way to mea-
sure the extent of the burden, a court would look to the percentage of
Montanans who would not be able to vote because of the law even though
they are otherwise eligible.201  Other factors that would establish the burden
on eligible voters are the money necessary to get identification and the time
and ability necessary to navigate the bureaucracy, what notice was provided
to voters about the law, how soon before the election the law was enacted,
and other ways for voters to vote (e.g. absentee voting).202
C. With What Result?
If a plaintiff were to challenge the constitutionality of the Bill, she
should cite Article II, section 13; Article IV, section 2; and the Montana
Code Annotated, Title 13.  Given the legislative history of Article II, sec-
tion 13, it is clear that it would have the most force when supplemented by
the other provisions.  The proposed Montana voter ID law is stricter than
196. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1972, supra n. 34, at vol. III, 400–401, 406,
552.
197. Finke, 65 P.3d at 580 (quoting Johnson v. Killingsworth, 894 P.2d 272, 273 (Mont. 1995)).
198. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1165 (Mont. 2012).
199. Finke, 65 P.3d at 580 (quoting Johnson, 894 P.2d at 273–274).
200. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
201. This is how the Weinschenk Court determined the extent of the burden.  203 S.W.3d at 215.
202. Langholz, supra n. 97, at 789, 791, 793–794, 797.
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the law analyzed in League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc.; therefore, the
issue would play out differently in Montana than it did in Indiana.  Instead,
the Montana case would likely resemble Common Cause/Georgia, Wein-
schenk, or League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Network, Inc.
The legislative history of Article II, section 13 suggests that the dele-
gates to the 1972 Convention would have been skeptical of a legislative
restriction and would not have been persuaded by Washburn’s concerns
about voter fraud.  The delegates’ discussion of Article IV, section 3, al-
lowing the legislature to establish a system of poll booth registration, high-
lights that they understood the idea behind the vote to be that “when you
put a restriction on it, that is, a restriction passed by a Legislature—they
must register 40 days before or they do not have that right—then you are
depriving, artificially, people of their vote, and when you deprive people of
their vote, you deprive them of their rights.”203  Delegate Dahood was not
concerned about the possibility of voter fraud and argued:
Our law, and the wisdom that formed the basis for our law, provides not only
judicial thinking but, by statute in this state, that all citizens are presumed to
be honest, and we must deal with all of our citizens on the basis that we
presume that when they participate in the functions of citizenship, they shall
participate in an honest manner and in an honest endeavor.204
Washburn’s intent behind the Bill to keep seasonal residents and out-of-
state college students from voting in Montana is incompatible with the dele-
gates’ desire to have as many voters as possible participate in elections.
Since a Montana court would apply strict scrutiny, it would analyze
whether the law was necessary to serve a compelling government interest.
Although Montana courts would probably agree Montana has a compelling
interest in preventing voter fraud, they would likely find the above law is
not necessary or narrowly tailored to accomplish that interest.  Under the
regime created by the Bill, it is possible for an individual to vote in absentia
without facing the same restrictions if she voted in person.  The Bill does
address provisional voting, though.  The State would have a stronger case if
it could demonstrate evidence of in-person voter fraud, but the Secretary of
State asserts that currently voter fraud does not exist in Montana.205  The
potential for voter fraud would probably be insufficient to justify the Bill.
As Representative Washburn conceded, the Bill does not address voters
who are registered to vote in more than one state.  The Bill would not pass
constitutional muster.
203. Mont. Const. art. IV, § 3 (1972).  Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings of 1972,
supra n. 34, at vol. III, 409. Though the provision on poll booth registration was originally in a minority
report, it was adopted by the Convention. Id. at 412–413.
204. Id. at 406.
205. McCulloch, supra n. 190.
23
Tokerud: The Right of Suffrage in Montana: Voting Protections under the St
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-2\MON210.txt unknown Seq: 24 17-JUN-13 10:22
440 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 74
V. CONCLUSION
Challengers to voter ID laws should more often look to Montana’s
constitutional right-to-vote clause.  None of the possible explanations for
why the right has been cited so infrequently bar it from being raised by
future litigants.  However, though there is no formal requirement under
Montana law that cases challenging voter ID laws be brought in any partic-
ular fashion, it may need to be cited with other constitutional provisions.
Article II, section 13 does little on its own given the frequent references to
“supplementing” and “augmenting” the right.  The history of the right, the
way similar constitutional provisions are interpreted in other states, and the
inherent ambiguity in the phrase support this hybrid approach.  If the scope
of the right to vote were defined more broadly, it could be used in a variety
of circumstances, such as to challenge the consolidation of polling places.
Litigants should push courts to interpret the right to vote so that it can be
used effectively in subsequent challenges to laws impinging on voters’
rights.
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